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We study information aggregation in large elections. With two candidates, eﬃcient information 
aggregation  is  possible  in  a  large  election  (e.g.,  Feddersen  and  Pesendorfer  [4,  5,  6],  among 
others). We ﬁnd that this result does not extend to large elections with more than two candidates. 
More precisely, we study a class of simple scoring rules in large voting games with Poisson 
population uncertainty and three candidates. We show that there is no simple scoring rule that 
aggregates information eﬃciently, even if preferences are dichotomous and a unique Condorcet 
winner always exists. We introduce a weaker criterion of informational eﬃciency that requires a 
voting rule to have at least one eﬃcient equilibrium. Only approval voting satisﬁes this criterion. 
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We are interested in information aggregation in large elections when voters
are strategic. Voters hold private information about the states of nature, but
cannot communicate their private information to each other. In this context,
voting rules can be judged according to their eciency in aggregating private
information.
Ecient information aggregation is clearly a relevant characteristic of a
voting rule when the preferences of some of the voters depend on the state
of nature. We refer to these voters as independent voters (as opposed to
ideological, or partisan, voters, whose preferences do not depend on the state
of nature). For the independent voters, one of the candidates to choose from
is more suitable than the others (let us call her the 'best' candidate). Which
one it is depends on the state of nature.
The general idea of ecient information aggregation (or informational
eciency) is that the result of the election is what it would be if all the
relevant information were public information. Or, more precisely, it requires
the probability that the elected candidate is the same as if information were
public to tend to 1 as the size of the population tends to innity. When there
are two candidates, it means that the candidate who would be preferred
by the majority of voters if information were public is elected in spite of
the asymmetry of information. When there are three or more candidates,
however, even if information is public, the elected candidate typically depends
on the voting rule. That is the classical preference aggregation problem.
We will therefore impose restrictions on preferences that guarantee that our
results do not depend on the voting rule in this way.
Our assumption that voters are strategic follows the literature introduced
by Feddersen and Pesendorfer [4], Myerson and Weber [11] and Myerson [9].
Voters vote in order to in
uence the outcome of the election. With uncer-
tainty over the size of the voting population, each individual voter always
has a strictly positive probability of being pivotal, independently of which
voting strategy is chosen by the voters. Following Myerson [9], we assume
that the size of the voting population follows a Poisson distribution.
To simplify matters, we make assumptions on preferences and the distri-
bution of information in such a way that voters have ex-post dichotomous
preferences and a unique Condorcet winner exists. Moreover, this Condorcet
winner would be elected under plurality rule if the state of nature were known.
Our denition of informational eciency of a voting rule requires the outcome
2of the election to coincide with the Condorcet winner in each equilibrium of
the voting game.
The current wisdom is that ecient information aggregation is possible
with strategic voters when there are two serious candidates and preferences
of the independent voters are not too dierent. This wisdom is build upon
three dierent sets of papers.
The rst set assumes that independent voters have the same preferences,
but dier in prior probability distributions or in the signals they receive about
the states of nature. Myerson [8] and Feddersen and Pesendorfer [4] study
the plurality rule and nd that ecient information aggregation is possible.
Bouton and Castanheira [2] use approval voting to obtain informational
eciency in a situation in which two serious candidates have to pass a vote-
threshold of partisan votes of a third (not serious) candidate. To achieve
this, voters have to give votes to more than one candidate.
Information aggregation in these models amounts to solving a coordina-
tion problem among independent voters with dierent posterior beliefs about
the state of nature. However, even if these voters have dierent posterior be-
liefs, they all vote rationally conditional on the probability of being pivotal
(i.e., of submitting a vote that changes the outcome of the election). This
harmonizes their posterior beliefs, and they can coordinate their votes in
such a fashion that the decisive fraction of voters consists of those with the
correct information.
The second set, Feddersen and Pesendorfer [5, 6], generalizes the above
result to cases in which the independent voters have dierent preferences.
However, preferences still satisfy some monotonicity criterion, as the third
set shows, which makes them similar enough to achieve ecient information
aggregation.
The third set, Bhattacharya [1] (a singleton), seriously challenges the
above results by showing that ecient information aggregation in a two-
candidate election is a consequence of the assumption that preferences are
monotonic in information. If belief updating leads to opposite changes in two
voters' preferences over two candidates (non-monotonic preferences), ecient
information aggregation is no longer possible in a two-candidate election.
In this paper, we challenge the current wisdom by showing that ecient
information aggregation is impossible with three serious candidates, even if
the independent voters have the same preferences.
Notice that this impossibility result is not a consequence of the typical
diculties with preference aggregation when there are more than three types
3(in our model, independent voters coexist with three types of partisan voters,
one type for each candidate). By assuming that voters have dichotomous
preferences, we remove the issue of preference aggregation and can focus
exclusively on information aggregation. Any impossibility we discover is
caused solely by a failure of the independent voters to coordinate their votes.
We study a class of simple scoring rules similar to those in Myerson [10].
Two of the most popular voting rules in our class are plurality rule and
approval voting. Our rst result is that none of the simple scoring rules
in our class satises informational eciency. There are two quite dierent
reasons for this: First, for all scoring rules but approval voting, we can always
nd non-degenerate sets of parameters of the voter population for which no
informationally ecient strategies exist.
Second, and more importantly, with three candidates there exist non-
degenerate information sets (signals) such that the dierences in posterior
beliefs of voters with dierent signals are suciently large to create a coor-
dination problem between them, even if they all vote conditional on being
pivotal and have the same preferences. As a consequence, the decisive frac-
tion of voters is not the one with the correct information, and the wrong
candidate is elected. Even approval voting suers from this problem.
Since all rules fail to satisfy informational eciency (but not all for the
same reason), we also dene a weaker criterion of informational eciency:
A voting rule is weakly informationally ecient if it has at least one in-
formationally ecient equilibrium for each set of parameters of the voter
population. Our second result is that only approval voting satises this weak
criterion.
This second result alone is not surprising. Brams and Fishburn [3] already
nd in a model of preference aggregation, rather than information aggrega-
tion, that approval voting always elects the Condorcet winner if preferences
are dichotomous. Laslier [7], who studies preference aggregation in a large
election with vote uncertainty (but not population uncertainty), also nds
that approval voting always elects the Condorcet winner, if one exists. Nunez
[12], however, mitigates this result in a model of preference aggregation with
population uncertainty by constructing an economy with an equilibrium in
which the Condorcet winner is not elected (this result does not hold if pref-
erences are dichotomous).
The surprising result of this paper, therefore, is that approval voting is
only weakly informationally ecient.
In Section 2, we describe the model. In Section 3, we examine all scoring
4rules, except approval voting, and show that none is even weakly informa-
tionally ecient. In Section 4, we develop the mathematical tools necessary
to analyze approval voting in a large Poisson game with strategic voters.
In Section 5, we show that there always exists an informationally ecient
equilibrium with approval voting. In Section 6, we construct an economy
for which not all equilibria with approval voting are informationally ecient.
Combining the results in Sections 5 and 6, we infer that approval voting is
the only weakly ecient rule, but that it is not ecient. In Section 7, we
conclude.
2 The Setting
Consider an election in which voters elect one candidate into oce from a set
of candidates K = fA;B;Cg. The state of nature is uncertain and drawn
from set k = fa;b;cg with prior probabilities a;b, and c.
Voters are either partisans or independent voters, and their type is private
information. Partisan voters of candidate X 2 K, denote their type by tX
and their fraction in the population by pX, care only about candidate X
being in oce, irrespective of the state of nature. And, as all other voters in
the population, they derive utility from the outcome of the election alone.
uX(X j z) = 1 8 z 2 k; X 2 K;
uX(Y j z) = 0 8 z 2 k; Y 6= X 2 K: (1)
Contrary to partisans, independent voters, denote their type by tIV and
their fraction by pIV , have preferences that depend on the state of nature: In
state x, candidate X is their best candidate, and they are indierent between
the other two candidates.
uIV (X j x) = 1 8 X 2 K; x 2 k;
uIV (Y j x) = 0 8 Y 6= X 2 K; x 2 k: (2)
Before the election takes place, voters receive private signals. Let ?
denote a non-informative signal. Let XY denote the signal that the best
candidate is either X or Y , and let X denote the signal that X is the best
candidate. In state x 2 k, the possible signals are ?;XY;XZ, and X. Let
't;s
z be the probability that a voter of type t receives private signal s in state
z.
5The partisan voters receive a non-informative signal:
'
tX;?
z = 1 8 z 2 k; X 2 K: (3)
Among the independent voters, there are uninformed, informed, and par-
tially informed voters. The uninformed independents, denote their type by
tU and their fraction by pU, receive a non-informative signal:
'
tU;?
z = 1 8 z 2 k: (4)
The informed independents, denote their type by tI and their fraction by
pI, receive a signal such that they know the best candidate with certainty.
'
tI;X
x = 1 8 x 2 k; X 2 K;
'
tI;Y
x = 0 8 x 2 k; Y 6= X 2 K: (5)
The partially informed independents, denote their type by tP and their
fraction by pP, receive signals that depend on the state of nature. In state




x = 1   '
tP;XZ
x 8 x 2 k; X 6= Y 6= Z 6= X 2 K: (6)
As it will become clear below, our way of modeling partial information
about the state of nature is crucial for the results. In addition, it is the
only way to make a distinction between uninformed and partially informed
voters in this model. If informative signals yield belief updating that does
not eliminate one candidate for sure, then uninformed and partially informed
choose the same strategy in the limit (and ecient information aggregation
is possible).
Let us note that 'tP;XY
x for x 2 k and X;Y 2 K are the only variable








The type space is T = fA;B;C;I;U;Pg, and the signal space is S =
f?;AB;AC;BC;A;B;Cg.
An economy E is a list (;p;') that satises two restrictions. First, it
must be true that pA +pB +pC +pU +pI +pP = 1:1 And second, we assume
1We could allow for strict inequality. This would imply that there exists a fraction of
the population whose utility does not depend on the outcome of the election. We would
assume that these voters do not vote.
6that there is no aggregate uncertainty. If voters were to communicate their
signals truthfully, the aggregation of signals would reveal the state of nature.
This requires either the existence of some informed voters (pI > 0), or, if
pI = 0, it requires the existence of some partially informed voters (pP > 0)
such that by combining the signals received by all of them it must be possible
to deduce the state of nature: 'XY
x > 0 for all x 2 k, all Y 6= X 2 K. All
parameters of E are common knowledge.
We are interested in simple scoring rules. We dene a V -scoring rule
as follows: Voters choose between two ballot options, (1;0;0) and (1;V;0).
That is, they can either give one point to only one candidate, or they can give
one point to one candidate and V points to another. A voter can choose one
of these ballot options and distribute the points over the three candidates.
Plurality voting corresponds to V = 0, and approval voting corresponds to
V = 1.
This class of scoring rules is a subset of the (V;W)-scoring rules analyzed
in Myerson [10]. These scoring rules are characterized by two parameters
(V;W) with 0  W  V  1 such that a voter chooses between ballot
options (1;V;0) and (1;W;0).
We restrict our attention to rules with W = 0. In our setting, some voters
(the partisans and the informed independents) can identify their preferred
candidate and are indierent between the two others. As we will show below,
W = 0 implies that these voters have a dominant strategy. Consequently,
information aggregation is a matter of coordination between the uninformed
and the partially informed independent voters. Given that we will prove
that coordination typically fails between these voters, allowing for a strictly
positive W would only create additional problems. We do not prove it in
this paper, but it is reasonably clear that the coordination problems increase
with a strictly positive W, so that our main result holds for those voting
rules, too.
Voters submit ballots b 2 B. A ballot is a vector b = (bA;bB;bC) 2 B
which indicates that bX points are given to candidate X. The voters' action
set B includes all permutations of (1;0;0) and (1;V;0), as well as (0;0;0)
to represent abstention. The candidate with the highest number of points is
elected into oce. We assume that a tie involving A is broken in favor of A,
and a tie between B and C is broken in favor of B. This assumption has no
impact on the results.
The population of voters is large. Following Myerson [9], among others,
we assume that the number of voters who vote in the election is uncertain
7and follows a Poisson distribution with parameter n. The probability that





Let V , the parameter of the voting rule, be given. Let E be an economy.
For any expected size of the population n, a strategy is a function n :
T  S ! (B), associating a pair of type and signal with a probability
distribution over B. We let n;b(t;s)  0 denote the probability that a voter
(t;s) chooses action b. It has to be true that
P
b2B n;b(t;s) = 1 for all
(t;s) 2 TS. To save on notation, we occasionally suppress either the type
or the signal, if it is not misleading.
Suppose that 
n is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the voting game for
some economy E with n expected voters.2 We are interested in limit equilibria
 such that 
n !  as n ! 1.
3 Informational Ineciency of Scoring Rules
Before we can investigate the properties of information aggregation of V -
scoring rules, we have to dene ecient information aggregation. In an
economy with partisans and independents, the notion of ecient information
aggregation is not obvious. The partisans' utility does not depend on the
state of nature, nor on the ability of the voting rule to reveal it, but the
utility of the independent voters does.
Since we are mostly interested in the strategic interactions among in-
formed, uninformed, and partially informed voters, we dene informational
eciency only for cases in which the independent voters are part of a major-
ity. In these cases only, the properties of information aggregation through a
voting rule are worthwhile discussing. If the independent voters are part of
a majority, a Condorcet winner exists and coincides with the candidate that
would be elected by plurality rule, if all information were public. We require
an informationally ecient voting rule to elect this Condorcet winner.
2As it is typical in large Poisson games, strategies are dened type by type, and not
agent by agent. This implies that all agents of the same type play the same strategy in
an equilibrium. This corresponds to the restriction to symmetric equilibria in Feddersen
and Pesendorfer [4].
8Let V be a voting rule parameter, and let E be an economy. Let Pn(Xjz)
be the probability that candidate X is elected in state z given strategy prole
n.
Denition 1. Informational Eciency A V -scoring rule is informa-
tionally ecient if and only if, for all E 2 E and all X;Y;Z 2 K such
that
pX + pI + pP + pU > maxfpY;pZg; (8)
and for all limit equilibria , we have P(Xjx) = 1.
Typically, there is more than one limit equilibrium for each V and each
E. Our denition of informational eciency is very demanding because it
requires all limit equilibria to be informationally ecient. As we will see later,
this is never satised. So, we also dene a weaker version of informational
eciency. Weak informational eciency only requires a scoring rule to have
at least one informationally ecient equilibrium for each economy.
Denition 2. Weak Informational Eciency A V -scoring rule is weakly
informationally ecient if and only if, for all E 2 E and all X;Y;Z 2 K
such that
pX + pI + pP + pU > maxfpY;pZg;
there exists one limit equilibrium  such that P(Xjx) = 1:
Our rst result is that no voting rule with V < 1 is weakly informationally
ecient. Theorem 1, actually, proves a much stronger result. There do
not even exist strategies such that partisans only vote for their preferred
candidate and the best candidate is sure to be elected when she should be.
The reason why scoring rules with V < 1 are not informationally ecient is
that we can construct economies in which voters do not have enough votes
to give to the candidates to ensure they win when they ought to. If voters
can only give V points rather than 1 point to a second candidate, this second
candidate might not receive enough votes to win.
Theorem 1. For any V -scoring rule with V < 1 there exist economies E 2 E
for which there is no sequence of strategy functions n with partisans voting
for their candidate and
lim
n!1Pn(Xjx) = 1:
9Consequently, no V -scoring rule with V < 1 (that is, dierent from approval
voting) is weakly informationally ecient.
Proof. Let V < 1 be given. Let E = (;p;') satisfy: pP = 0 (so that pI > 0),
pA > pB = pC, pI > 0, pU > 0, and
pA < pI + pU + pB; (9)
pA > pI +
1 + V
2
pU + pB: (10)
Note that Eq. (9) implies that by weak informational eciency B and C
should be elected in state b and c, respectively, for at least one limit equilib-
rium. Let n be given. Let 
X
y (n) denote the expected fraction of votes for
X in state y when voters play n. Let us assume that partisans only vote for
their preferred candidate:
n;(bX=1;bY;Z=0)(tX) = 1 8X;Y;Z 2 K:
Given that type tU voters cannot condition their vote on the state of nature
(whereas type tI voters can), B receives the largest number of votes in b, and
C in c, and A receives the lowest number of votes in these states, if
n;(0;1;0)(tI;B) = n;(0;0;1)(tI;C) = 1;
n;(0;1;V )(tU) + n;(0;V;1)(tU) = 1:
That is, informed voters give the maximum number of points to the best
candidate, and uninformed voters distribute all their points between B and














pU + pB + pC

: (11)















10The scoring rule with V = 1, approval voting, does not bear this par-
ticular insuciency. This is why, in the following sections, we focus our
attention on approval voting. It remains as the only rule possibly satisfying
informational eciency, weak or strong.
4 Magnitudes and Best Replies
In this section, we develop some tools necessary for the analysis of approval
voting in a large Poisson voting game. Because we restrict our attention to
this particular scoring rule, we make a few notational simplications.
With approval voting, a voter's choice is between ballot options (1;1;0)
and (1;0;0). A voter's action set is B = fA;B;C;AB;AC;BC;?g, indicat-
ing which candidate(s) receive a point, or abstention (?).
Because voters derive utility solely from the outcome of the election,
they pay attention only to pivotal events. In a pivotal event, a voter's ballot
changes the outcome of the election from one candidate to another. Consider
for example a tie between candidates A and B, and candidate C far behind.
This is a pivotal event for a voter who considers ballot B. The additional vote
for B changes the outcome of the election from A to B under our tie-breaking
rule.
Pivotal event EXY
z is the event in which one additional vote for X and
no additional vote for Y changes the outcome of the election from Y to X
in state z. The probability of this pivotal event is pivXY
z .
Whether a voter prefers some ballot b over ? depends on the expected
utility gain. For a partisan of candidate X, for example, the expected gain










The expected gain depends on the likelihood of those pivotal events in which
ballot X changes the outcome of the election, while ballot ? does not. For
the same partisan, the expected gain from choosing ballot XY rather than





There is a dierence between Eqs. (12) and (13) because ballot XY does
not change the vote dierence between candidates X and Y , but ballot X
does. Both expressions are non-negative, and Eq. (12) is larger than Eq.
11(13). It is easily veried as well that a partisan of X never chooses a ballot
with zero points for X. Combining these facts, we conclude that ballot X is
a dominant strategy for partisans of X.
Consider an informed voter with signal X. The expected gain from choos-









Both expressions are non-negative; Eq. (14) is larger than Eq. (15), and also
larger than the expected gain from any other ballot over ?. We conclude
that informed voters have a dominant strategy to vote for X, and only for
X, when they receive signal X.
Uninformed and partially informed independents have no precise infor-
mation. Necessarily, they consider pivotal events in dierent states of nature.
The utility gain from ballot b over ? depends on the state of nature: In state
x, ballot X is a good choice, while in state y it is not.
For uninformed independents, the expected gain from ballots X or XY















Y Z   zpiv
Y Z: (17)
Eqs. (16) and (17) are not necessarily both non-negative. Moreover, it is not
immediately obvious which of the two is largest. Uninformed independents
do not have a dominant strategy, and they might even want to abstain.
Partially informed voters have updated beliefs about the state of nature.
Let XY
x be the probability of state x conditional on receiving signal XY . For
a partially informed voter with signal XY , the expected gain from ballots X























Again, it is not immediately obvious which of Eqs. (18) or (19) is largest. It
is clear, however, that Eq. (19) is non-negative. A partially informed voter
12with signal XY always prefers ballot XY over ballot ?. Partially informed
independents never choose to abstain.
Nevertheless, we need more precise tools to evaluate expressions like Eqs.
(16) through (19). In large elections, probabilities of pivotal events converge
to zero. If best replies of uninformed and partially informed voters are to be
meaningful, we have to evaluate utility dierences between two dierent bal-
lots, even though the expected utilities from both ballots eventually converge
to zero as n ! 1.
Probabilities of pivotal events do not converge to zero at the same speed.
Events converging fast become negligible compared to events converging more
slowly, and they can be ignored in expressions like Eqs. (16) through (19).
Consequently, only those events that converge most slowly have to be con-
sidered.
Myerson [9] denes the magnitude of an event in a large Poisson game as
a measure of its speed of convergence to zero. Let us denote the expected









and let z = (b
z)b2B. The expected number of voters choosing ballot b in
state z is nb
z. The magnitude  of an event EXY







The Magnitude Theorem (Myerson [10]) in the Appendix shows how to cal-
culate the magnitude of a pivotal event. The magnitude of an event is non-
positive. It is zero if the probability of an event does not converge to zero,
or it is negative and indicates the speed of convergence. Events with larger
magnitude converge to zero more slowly and are innitively more likely in a
large Poisson game than events with smaller magnitude.
Suppose events EXY
x and EXY
y have the largest magnitudes. If (EXY
x ) >
(EXY
y ), a voter choosing ballot X is innitively more likely to be pivotal in
state x than in state y. Best replying certainly requires a point to candidate
X, but not to candidate Y . Whether the voter also gives a point to can-
didate Z depends on the ranking of the remaining magnitudes. Generally,
under approval voting, an uninformed or a partially informed voter votes for
candidate X only if one of the most likely tie events involving X occurs in
state x.
13In the following two sections, we establish the two main results on ap-
proval voting. In Section 5, we show that approval voting is weakly in-
formationally ecient. In Section 6, we show that approval voting is not
informationally ecient.
5 Approval voting is weakly informationally
ecient
According to Denition 2, a V -scoring rule is weakly informationally ecient
if it has at least one informationally ecient equilibrium. Theorem 2 states
that this is true if V = 1.
Theorem 2. Approval voting is weakly informationally ecient.
Proof. Assume that V = 1. The proof is divided into two steps. In step 1,
we show that for any E 2 E such that Eq. (8) is satised for all X 2 K,
there exists a sequence of strategy proles n such that Pn(Xjx) ! 1 as
n ! 1 for all X 2 K (we omit the similar and simpler proof that the claim
is also true for economies such that Eq. (8) is true only for a subset of K).
In step 2, we deduce from step 1 that there exists a limit equilibrium  that
aggregates information eciently.
Assume without loss of generality that pA  pB  pC.
Step 1: Case 1: pI > 0: Let n be dened as follows (as it does not
depend on n, we drop the index). Partisans and informed independents play
their dominant strategies:
X(tX) = 1 8X 2 K; (22)
X(tI;X) = 1 8X 2 K: (23)
Both uninformed and partially informed voters mix between voting and
abstaining such that their votes compensate the partisan dierence between
candidates A and C.







14Some uninformed voters who vote give votes to both B and C, but without
increasing the votes for B above pA. The remaining fraction of uninformed








C(tU) = 1   ?(tU)   BC(tU): (26)
Partially informed voters with signals AC and BC vote for C, if they do not
abstain. Those with signal AC who vote do not vote for A, but those with
signal BC who vote might vote for B as well.
C(tP;AC) = 1   ?(tP); (27)
C(tP;BC) + BC(tP;BC) = 1   ?(tP): (28)
Partially informed voters with signal BC who vote give votes to B, but












1   ?(tP) if 'BC
c = 0:
(29)
Partially informed voters who receive signal AB and vote give votes to












1   ?(tP) if 'AB
a = 0:
(30)
Given , we can now verify that candidate X is elected in state x for all










z 8 x 2 k; X;Y;Z 2 K: (31)









a = pA + pI:
With Eqs. (25) and (30):

B
a = pB + pUBC(tU) + pP'AB
a B(tP;AB)  pA:
If the constraint on BC(tU) and/or B(tP;AB) is not binding, so that
BC(tU) = 1   ?(tU) and/or B(tP;AB) = 1   ?(tP), then 
B
a < pA.
Otherwise, by construction, 
B
a = pA.




a = pC + pUfBC(tU) + C(tU)g + pP'AC
a C(tP;AC)  pA:
15Similar arguments apply to the cases below.










With Eqs. (25), (26), and (29):

B
c = pB + puBC(tU) + pP'BC
c BC(tP;BC)  pA:








c C(tP;AC)g = pI+pC+pU(1 ?(tU))+pP(1 ?(tP)) = pI+pA > pA,
the last equality stemming from Eq. (24).
















c fC(tP;BC)+BC(tP;BC)g  pA:
With Eqs. (25), (30), and (30):

B
b = pI + pB + pUBC(tU) + pPf'AB
b B(tP;AB) + 'BC
b BC(tP;BC)g.




























c  1: This is true since 'AB
b + 'BC
b = 1 and 'AB
a ;'BC
c  1:




b is true if either BC(tP;BC) = 1   ?(tP) or
B(tP;AB) = 1   ?(tP), but not both.










so that B may not be elected in b. To obtain an informationally ecient
strategy function in these cases, only small changes are necessary. Observe
that Eqs. (8) and (24) imply that ?(tP) > 0. It is therefore possible to
slightly decrease the probability of abstaining of partially informed voters,
and slightly increase their probability of voting according to their signal. For








where n > 0 is a sequence of strictly positive small fractions such that
lim
n!1
nn = N > 0:





x ), and nn('AC
x + 'BC
x ) respectively, which
always breaks the possible ties in favour of the best candidate (recall that in
state x all partially informed receive a signal including X).
Step 2: Let 
n be a strategy such that Eqs. (22) and (23) hold for all n,
and 
n(tU) and 
n(tP;) are dened as the strategies that maximize the ex-
ante utility of the uninformed and partially informed voters (recall that they
all have the same utility function). Such strategies exist, as they maximize
a continuous function on a compact set. We claim they are equilibrium
strategies. Indeed, the existence of a protable deviation would contradict
the fact that 
n(tU) and 
n(tP;) maximize expected utilities. Also, it is
impossible that the expected utility from 
n(tU) and 
n(tP;) is lower than
that from (tU) and (tP;) dened in Step 1. The expected utility of an
independent agent tends to 1 if candidate X is elected in state x for all X 2
K. Given that Pn(Xjx) ! 1 as n ! 1 for all X 2 K, so that the expected
utility associated with  tends to 1, and, given that, by construction, 
n yields
at least the same expected utility as , it has to be true that P
n(Xjx) ! 1 for
all X 2 K. So, limn!1 
n is a limit equilibrium that aggregates information
eciently.
Combining Theorems 1 and 2, we conclude that approval voting is the
only weakly ecient scoring rule. Indeed, it is possible to construct an in-
formationally ecient strategy prole for every E 2 E only if V = 1. In the
next section, we show that approval voting is not informationally ecient.
6 Approval voting is not informationally e-
cient
Unfortunately, even with approval voting there exist economies, and limit
equilibria for these economies, for which the best candidate is not elected
with probability converging to 1. This is what we prove in this section.
Theorem 3. Approval voting is not informationally ecient.
17Proof. In the proof, we construct E 2 E satisfying Eq. (8) with a limit
equilibrium  in which A is not elected in state a. Consider E 2 E such
that pA = pB = 0:33, pC = 0:14, pU = 0:02, pP = 0:15, pI = 0:03, 'AB
a = 0:9,
'AB
b = 0:1, and 'AC
c = 0:5. Let  be such that partisans and informed voters
play the dominant strategy, uninformed voters vote only for C, partially
informed voters with signals AC and BC vote only for C, and partially
informed voters with signal AB vote only for B: X(tX) = 1 and X(tI;X) =
1 for all X 2 K, C(tU) = C(tP;AC) = C(tP;BC) = B(tP;AB) = 1.
This implies that 
A
a = 0:36; 
B
a = 0:465; 
C
a = 0:175; 
A





b = 0:16; 
A
c = 0:33; 
B
c = 0:33; 
C





a , so that A is not elected in a for suciently large n.
So,  does not aggregate information eciently.
Let XY
z denote the magnitude of event EXY
z . Computations based on




















To show that  is a limit equilibrium, we only need to prove that unin-
formed and partially informed voters play a best response.
For the uninformed voters, the most likely pivotal events are the two
relevant ties in state c. So, ballot C is a best response.
Partially informed consider dierent pivotal events. For those with signal
AB, the most likely pivotal event occurs in state b. So, ballot B is a best re-
sponse. For those with signal AC or BC, the most likely pivotal event occurs





a , so that B is elected in a.
If information were public, the economy presented in the proof would have
a unique equilibrium under approval voting, in which the Condorcet winner
is elected (all independents vote for X in state x, even if they also vote for
another candidate). The ineciency we nd, therefore, is not a consequence
of diculties associated with preference aggregation (as it is, for example, in
the inecient equilibria in Myerson [10]). It is rather caused by the failure
of independent voters with dierently precise information to coordinate their
votes.
Inecient equilibria of the type presented in the proof exist in our model
because of two main features: The partially informed voters consider dierent
states of nature than the uninformed voters, and the fractions of partially
informed voters with dierent signals are state-dependent. These two factors
18create a coordination problem between the two voter types. Even though
they have the same ex-post preferences, conditional on the state of nature,
and are numerous enough to compensate the partisan dierence between
candidates, they are not able to coordinate their votes eciently.
We conclude this section by insisting on the fact that this result follows
from the presence of partially informed agents. If all independent voters are
either informed or uninformed, then informational eciency is possible, as
stated in the following remark.
Remark 1. Over the domain of economies without partially informed voters,
approval voting is informationally ecient.
Proof. See Appendix.
Let us recall here that Theorem 1 also holds over the domain of economies
without partially informed agents. The proof of Theorem 1 is indeed devel-
oped under the assumption that pP = 0: Consequently, if we restrict our
attention to economies without partially informed agents, then we can state
that approval voting is the only scoring rule that is weakly informationally
ecient, and, moreover, is informationally ecient.
7 Conclusion
This paper challenges the received wisdom that information aggregation is
possible in large elections with simple voting rules when independent voters
(that is, voters whose ranking of the candidates depend on the state of nature)
have identical preferences. Here, independent voters dier in terms of the
signals they receive. Partially informed agents, who are key for the result,
receive the signal that one candidate out of three is, for sure, not the best
one. This additional information turns out to create a coordination problem
that no scoring rule can solve.
To conclude, let us note that our results are not restricted to the class
of simple scoring rules we consider. We have assumed that agents choose
between ballots (1;0;0) and (1;V;0): Theorem 1 straightforwardly extends to
scoring rules with ballot options (1;0;0) and (V1;V2;0), which is obviously a
more general class of rules. So, we reach the conclusion that weak information
eciency is only possible if V1 = V2 = 1; that is, with approval voting.
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Any pivotal event EXY
z is characterized by a collection of linear inequalities.
Consider, for example, event EBA
z . According to our tie-breaking rule, this
event is the collection of election outcomes such that candidates A and B
have the same number of votes, and candidate C does not have more votes













z , where nb
z is the number of voters choosing ballot b
in state z. We use the Magnitude Theorem (Myerson [9]) to calculate the
magnitude of a pivotal event EXY
z by solving a maximization problem.
Theorem 4 (Myerson 2000, Theorem 1). Let EXY
z be an event, (nb
z)b2B a





























with  () = (1   log())   1, 8 > 0.
The Magnitude Theorem gives the value of the magnitude of a pivotal
event. The optimal nb
z that solves the maximization problem is the most likely
actual number of voters choosing each ballot b in state z, given the constraints
of the pivotal event. In large Poisson games, almost all the probability mass
of an event falls on this most likely subevent of EXY
z :
Magnitudes in Theorem 3
Notice that in the equilibrium of Theorem 3, each voter gives a point to one
candidate only. The only relevant fractions are, therefore, A
z , B
z , and C
z
8z 2 k (that is, we have 
X
z = X
z for all z 2 k;X 2 K).
Consider pivotal event EBA





z . Since the solution to the maximization problem in (33) de-
pends on whether the constraint nA
z  nC
z is binding or not, we consider the
two cases separately.
Case 1: The constraint on the number of votes for C is not binding, i.e., for
















Maximizing M(nz) over nz 2 EBA
z and setting nA
z = nB























































Case 2: The constraint on the number of votes for C is binding, i.e., for the




Maximizing M(nz) over nz 2 EBA
z and setting nA
z = nB
z = nC









































The values of b
z in the equilibrium of Theorem 3 are given in the proof of
Theorem 3. Using (34) and (35), we calculate the magnitudes of the relevant
pivotal events.










c t  7:46  10
 5:





0:33  0:33  0:34   (0:33 + 0:33 + 0:34) t  9:93  10
 5






0:3  0:3 = 0:3 < 0:34 = 
C
c :
22Proof of Remark 1
Proof. Let E 2 E be such that pP = 0 (so that pI > 0). Let  be a limit
equilibrium for E: We know that all partisans of X have a dominant strategy
to vote for X only, for all X 2 K. We know that all informed voters vote for
X in state x. We also know that uninformed voters cannot condition their
vote on the state of nature. Consequently, the total number of votes does not
depend on the state of nature. There are two immediate consequences of this
fact:
1. The swing voter's curse (see Feddersen and Pesendorfer [4]: If some
uninformed voters vote for X and Y , then none of them votes for Z,
for all X 6= Y 6= Z 6= X 2 K.
2. A tie event between X and Y is more likely in state x than in state y
if and only if the victory margin is smaller in state x than in state y,









Let us assume that pX +pI +pU > maxfpY;pZg, whereas P(Xjx) = 0: Let

































































We can also deduce that either not all uninformed vote for X, so that

X(tU) + 
XY (tU) + 
XZ(tU) < 1 (Case 1), or that all uninformed voters
vote for X, but some uninformed voters also vote for Y , so that 
Y(tU) +

XY (tU) + 
Y Z(tU) > 0 (Case 2).
In Case 1, Eq. (36) implies that one of the most likely ties involving X












Eq. (37) and Fact 2 above imply that
pZ + pU

Z+XZ+Y Z  pX + pU

X+XY +XZ;







so that a tie between X and Z requires rst that X and Z get the same
number of votes, but also that X gets weakly more votes than Y , which
itself is less likely than a tie between X and Y in state x. It is therefore
impossible that not all uninformed vote for X.
In Case 2, Eq. (36) and the fact that some uninformed voters vote for Y
imply that one of the most likely ties must occur in state y, and that it has












Eq. (39), however, implies that the dierence in expected fractions of vote
for Y and Z is smaller in state y than in state z, which, using the fact that





















Given the fact that the economy satises Eq. (8), given the assumption
that some uninformed voters vote for Y , and given the fact that 
X(tU) +

XY (tU) + 
XZ(tU) = 1, there must be some some uninformed voters who
vote for Z. This is a contradiction to Fact 1 above.
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